Levees.Org

About Levees.Org

Levees.Org was founded in November of 2005 by Sandy Rosenthal, 50 and her son Stanford, now 17 while living in Lafayette, Louisiana after evacuating from New Orleans. They returned to the city and grew the organization to over 19,000 members. The non partisan grassroots group's mission is education that metro New Orleans was destroyed not by a natural disaster, but by the worst engineering failure in the world since Chernobyl. In 2006, Levees.Org was critical in adding robust Corps Reform measures to the Water Resources Development Act, and was instrumental is passage of federal legislation awarding Louisiana a fairer share in the revenues from royalties on off-shore drilling in the Gulf. Both goals were achieved and Levees.Org's role in those successes was widely recognized. The group's 2008 goal is passage of the 8/29 Investigation Act. Senate Bill 2826 sponsored by Senator Landrieu D-LA will authorize a truly independent and complete analysis of the flood protection failures in metro New Orleans. The Act has broad support from businesses, city governments, environmentalists, neighborhood and special interest groups, and major publications. Click here for the complete list of supporters. Levees.Org has no corporate sponsors and expenses are funded entirely by member donations.

About our Website

The Levees.Org website is designed and created by Stanford Rosenthal 17, a junior at Isidore Newman High School in New Orleans.

Videos, Photos, and More

Please visit us on your computer to download high-resolution photos and videos.

Why do we need an 8/29 Investigation?

Overview
The citizens of New Orleans and south Louisiana deserve the 8/29 Investigation, an independent analysis of the flood protection failures during Hurricane Katrina because the levee investigation requested by the White House was managed and overseen by the US Army Corps of Engineers, the same agency responsible for the flood protection's performance. This is a clear conflict of interest.

The Corps-sponsored the levee investigation
After the system-wide failure of the flood protection in metro New Orleans, Lt Gen Carl Strock, Corps commander and chief of Engineers commissioned the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to assess the performance of the flood protection. But more than two thirds of the IPET team work for the Army Corps of Engineers or Army Research and Development, and the three top directors are all Army Corps personnel.

If you look at the IPET report, you can see that every chapter is chaired or co-chaired by a US Army Corps of Engineers employee.

If you investigate yourself, what do you think you're going to find? Additionally, since the release of the IPET report in June 2006, two non-governmental levee analysis teams, the Independent Levee Investigation Team and Team Louisiana have criticized the IPET. There is no significant discussion of poor construction and the report remains incomplete in areas that would address potentially dysfunctional organizational processes, communications failures and decision making at and by the Army Corps of Engineers.

More questions on “so-called independence” of the IPET
In November 2005, Lt Gen Strock called upon the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) to create an External Review Panel (ERP) to peer review the Corps-sponsored IPET. The ERP is frequently held out by the Army Corps, the White House and even Congress as assurance that results of the IPET are valid and credible.

However, recently the ASCE has came under fire for what seemed an attempt to minimize and understate the mistakes of the Army Corps in the flooding. A June 2007 press release issued by the ASCE administration accompanying a report entitled The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why contained 5 falsehoods and apparently tried to minimize the Army Corps' role in the catastrophe. Under pressure from local civil engineers, the ASCE quietly removed the offending press release from their website, but has refused to issue a formal retraction.

Levees.Org has much reason to doubt the reliability of the flood protection system currently being redesigned and constructed that protects the lives and property of 1.5 million Americans. To date, Congress has appropriated a total of $7.1 billion to the Corps of Engineers to repair and strengthen metro New Orleans' flood protection system. The results from the possibly inaccurate and incomplete report will probably be used to change policies and create the plans to repair and strengthen the flood protection system.

A fully independent analysis of flood protection failures is needed to assure that all possible opportunities for improvement are considered. Taxpayers need a full return on the investment dollars that Congress authorizes and the citizens of south Louisiana need the best protection possible.

How would this Investigation be structured?
This Investigation would be mainly a fresh look by "unbiased objective eyes" at data already collected. The 9-11 Commission's model of bipartisan co-chairmanship provides a good model in assuring objectivity. Those who serve on this Investigation would be required to meet certain standards of objectivity and expertise in the fields of engineering and flood control.

How much time and how much money are needed?
The Investigation would require simply reexamining data from studies already completed so there is no need to go back to pulling out sheet pilings from the canal walls or taking soil samples from the levees. The study will cost about $5 million and will take about a year to complete.

Conclusion:
An independent investigation to examine and make recommendations regarding Louisiana's flood protection is vital to reestablishing public trust. This Commission would examine decades of possibly flawed governmental policy at the federal, state and local level. This is not about placing blame, but about moving forward in the best way because taxpayers need a full return on the investment dollars that Congress authorizes and the citizens of south Louisiana need the best protection possible.

Submitted by:
Sandy Rosenthal, Executive Director, Levees.Org
Vince Pasquantonio, Legislative Director, Levees.Org

Current Supporters:

On June 11, 2007 the Legislature of the State of Louisiana
unanimously passed a resolution calling for the 8/29 Investigation Act

New Orleans City Council
New Orleans Chamber of Commerce
Jefferson Parish Council
St. Bernard Parish Council
St. Bernard Chamber of Commerce
St. Tammany Parish Council
Second Wind, Small Business Coalition Metro New Orleans

New Orleans CityBusiness
Gambit Weekly
The Daily Advertiser (Lafayette, LA)

NAACP - New Orleans
National Urban League
League of Women Voters, New Orleans
National Council of Jewish Women, Greater New Orleans Section
The Citizens Road Home Action Team, CHAT
LA Roots
ACORN

Environmental Defense
Gulf Restoration Network
Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation
Save our Wetlands, Inc

Team Louisiana (PDF Link) / LA Dept of Transportation and Development
Robert Bea, U Cal / Independent Levee Investigation Team
Oliver Houck, Professor of Law, Tulane University

US Senator Mary Landrieu D-LA
US Sentator David Vitter R-LA
US Congressman Zach Wamp R-TN
US Congressman Charlie Melancon D-LA

LA Governor Bobby Jindal R-LA

LA Senator Walter Boasso R-1
LA Senator Julie Quinn R-6
LA Rep Karen Carter D-93
LA Rep Charmaine Marchand D-99

Fact One

The flooding of New Orleans and nearby St. Bernard parish was an avoidable predictable man-made disaster. The levee and canal walls failed because of human errors. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) refers to the flooding as the worst engineering catastrophe in US history.

Fact Two

Katrina did not strike New Orleans a direct hit; rather it passed east of the city. Winds in the New Orleans area were in the Cat 1 to Cat 2 range. The Corps' flood walls on the 17 th Street Canal in central New Orleans failed at water levels well below design load. Additionally, the Corps of Engineers has recently released an analysis revealing that their floodwalls were so poorly designed that the maximum safe load was only 7 feet of water, which is half the original 14 foot design.

Fact Three

The role of the US Army Corps of Engineers as defined in the Flood Control of 1965 is to design and build flood protection for metro New Orleans from the most severe storm characteristic of the region. The local interest's role is maintenance and visual inspections once the flood protection is completed. On August 29, 2005, flood walls and levees catastrophically failed throughout the city of New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. Many collapsed well below design thresholds (17th Street and London Avenue Canals). Others collapsed after a brief period of overtopping (Industrial Canal and Mississippi River Gulf Outlet) caused by “scouring” or erosion of the earthen levee walls – an egregious design flaw. When Katrina arrived, the flood protection was 60-90% complete, and scheduled for completion in 2015, exactly 50 years after authorization.

Fact Four

In June 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers admitted that faulty design specifications, incomplete sections and substandard construction of levee segments, not a hurricane was the primary cause of the flooding in the New Orleans area. In June 2007, a report released by an investigative team by the ASCE declared that two thirds of the flooding were due to levee breaches. The Army Corps of Engineers, a federal agency has sole authority over the design and construction of metro New Orleans’ flood protection as authorized by Congress in the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965.

Conclusion

Responsibility for the levee failures on August 29, 2005 in New Orleans rests squarely on the US Army Corps of Engineers and on Congress. This means that the federal government bears primary responsibility for the flooding of metro New Orleans and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of homes and livelihoods and tens of billions of dollars in damage.

The Corps has admitted they're at fault so why do a another study?
The Corps has admitted only to poor design of floodwalls on the 17th Street and London Avenue canals. They have not admitted to a litany of errors that they control. For example, levee walls in many areas were 2 feet too low, levees were not armored, levees mainly in eastern New Orleans and St. Bernard parish were filled with erodable sand instead of good clay, and numerous connective points were improperly constructed. The Corps chose the wrong standard project hurricane, therefore designing for too weak a storm and the Corps used a margin of safety appropriate for cattle, not people and their property. The Corps has not admitted that the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet played a role in the flooding by contributing to the death of buffering cypress forests and contributing to “funneling” of the storm surge into the heart of the city via the Industrial Canal.

Didn’t the local politicians divert federal levee money into local projects?
The only entity controlling federal flood protection funds is the federal US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). This is also true for work the Corps contracted out to private industries.

If the Corps is largely to blame, why did Louisiana consolidate their levee boards?
After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, the USACE became the sole authority for the design and construction of flood protection metro New Orleans. The role of the levee boards became primarily maintenance. In time, the levee boards became a source of patronage and some state money may have been diverted to projects unrelated to flood safety; however, such diversion was not relevant to the flood protection failures. The levee failures were due to poor design and construction not to maintenance. A state constitutional amendment recently passed in Louisiana has created a technically competent regional Levee Board whose job will include checking and rechecking the Corps’ work.

Didn’t the Mayor wait until too late to issue an evacuation order?
The Governor of Louisiana evacuated 90% of the region's vulnerable population in an evacuation that was the most successful ever of its magnitude. Those who stayed could not or would not leave and it's true that the City of New Orleans lacked a comprehensive plan for them. But even a 100% evacuation would have not have altered the destruction of 200,000 houses, 81,000 businesses, 175 schools, and 6 major hospitals. Further, had the Corps of Engineers built the the flood protection system that Congress had authorized and projected to be complete by 1978, Katrina would have been just a major wind event.

Haven’t New Orleans residents known for years that this could happen?
No, because the Corps assured the city's residents that they were safe from a Standard Project Hurricane (roughly equivalent to a Cat 3 Storm). New Orleans residents did not know that the flood walls could rupture 4 feet below design specs or that the floodwalls were designed to collapse if water briefly overtopped them. On August 25, 2006, Lt Gen Carl Strock conceded that “better communication from the Corps of the risk associated with the existing levee system might have spurred more people to evacuate” in advance of Katrina.

Congress gave you $110 billion. Isn't that enough?
Actually the $110 billion went to emergency response and administration for three storms, Hurricanes Rita, Wilma and Katrina across five states, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. The allocation includes almost $30 billion for FEMA's response and Department of Defense expenses including the restoration of federal facilities. And almost $20 billion was flood insurance payouts to citizens collecting on their own private insurance claims.

Why was New Orleans built below sea level in a bowl?
New Orleans was built neither below sea level nor in a “bowl.” The original residents settled on the high ground along the Mississippi River. Later developments eventually extended to nearby Lake Pontchartrian built upon fill to bring them above the average lake level. Navigable commercial waterways extended from the lake to downtown. After 1940, the state decided to close these waterways since there was a new Industrial Canal for waterborne commerce. Once these waterways were closed, the water table was drastically lowered by the city's drainage system and some areas settled up to 8 feet due to the consolidation of the underlying organic soils. After 1965, the US Army Corps built a levee system around a much larger geographic footprint that included previous marshland and swamp. The average elevation of the city is between 1 and 2 feet below sea level. There are no residential areas of the city that are currently more than 10 feet below sea level.

Is the Lower Ninth Ward the lowest area in town?
Interestingly, the vast majority of the portion of the city we call the "Lower Ninth Ward" is actually above sea level. "Lower" referred to that portion of the Ninth Ward which was downriver from the rest of the ward. The Lower Ninth Ward is separated from the Upper Ninth Ward by the Industrial Canal.

Why is the engineering community relatively quiet about blaming the Corps for the errors that caused so much damage and deaths?
The US Army Corps of Engineers hires civilian engineers to perform much of the design development. Openly criticizing the Corps is akin to biting the hand that feeds lucrative contracts to the majority of large engineering firms. For more information on this, contact .

Why rebuild the City of New Orleans?
The Port of New Orleans is the largest in the US and the fourth largest in the world. Sixty two percent of the consumer-spending public in the United States receive their goods through the gateway at the Port. New Orleans was founded 288 years ago on high ground along the Mississippi River and 125 miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico. The River's depth decreases dramatically north of the city, and so New Orleans is as far upriver as possible to accommodate large ocean going vessels. Sadly for the City, for the past 50 years, Corps of Engineers' water projects (mainly for oil and gas exploration) destroyed the wetlands which acted as buffers to storm surge. Environmentalists and business interests agree on this, and luckily this is reversable and cost-feasible. The bottom line is that with proper coastal management and a robust commitment from the Corps and Congress, New Orleans can and should be rebuilt